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I 
RESUMO 
 
A 27 de Novembro de 2006 ocorreu a ruptura da barragem de rejeitados das minas de Fonte 
Santa, provavelmente devida a uma combinação de riscos nomeadamente, precipitação extrema 
ocorrida nos dias anteriores e eventual obstrução do descarregador de cheias. Uma primeira 
visita ao local, pouco após o acidente, mostrou que a barragem praticamente desapareceu por 
completo e que uma parcela de lamas depositadas na albufeira havia sido igualmente 
transportada para jusante. Numa outra visita de campo, no início de 2007, foi efectuado um 
levantamento dos danos ocorridos no vale a jusante com registo das alturas máximas do 
escoamento e caracterização das zonas de erosão e de deposição de material sólido. 
Nesta dissertação apresenta-se a reconstituição do acidente da ruptura da barragem de 
rejeitados das minas de Fonte Santa, incluindo uma descrição da brecha, do processo de ruptura 
e das consequências no vale a jusante, nomeadamente em termos de alturas máximas de 
escoamento e alterações morfológicas mais marcantes. A brecha resultante do galgamento do 
corpo da barragem foi simulada com recurso a um modelo numérico, sendo os dados da ruptura 
utilizados no processo de calibração e validação deste. 
 
Palavras-chave: barragem, ruptura, brecha, vale a jusante 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
II  
ABSTRACT  
 
Fonte Santa mine tailings dam failed on 27th November 2006 probably due to a combination of 
hazards, an extraordinary rainfall on the previous days and the eventual clogging of the spillway. 
A first field visit shortly after the failure showed that the dam was completely washed away 
together with a fraction of the mud retained in the reservoir.  In another field visit, in the beginning 
of 2007, assessment of damages, maximum water levels and erosion and deposition areas in the 
downstream valley was performed.  
In this dissertation the accident of the failure of the Fonte Santa mine tailings dam is 
reconstructed in detail, including breach characteristics, rupture process and consequences in the 
downstream valley namely in what concerns maximum water levels and most notorious 
morphological changes. The breaching process resulting from extreme flood on the day of the 
event was simulated with a numerical model duly evaluated and calibrated through comparison 
with the real data.  
 
Keywords: dam, rupture, breach, downstream valley 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Natural disasters may constitute catastrophic events especially when they cause structural and 
personal damage to society. Dams induce an additional risk on river valleys due to the massif 
destructive potential of the volume of water storage on the reservoir flows thus in case of an 
accident with serious consequences the reduction of the impacts is necessary. Despite all the 
devices and security measures implemented nowadays, in practical terms it is impossible to 
eliminate all risks (ALMEIDA, 2011).   
Not all accidents with dams occur after natural extraordinary events. Until 1972 it was referenced 
that 50% of accidents with dams were due to human error at different stages of their life period 
(ICOLD, 1972). Failure mechanisms of dams can be a combination of effects associated with 
actions of nature, the type of the dam and the construction methods. Major causes of failures 
identified by COSTA (1985) [apud WAHL (1998)] are overtopping due to inadequate spillway 
capacity (34%), foundation problems (30%) and pipping and seepage (28%). Reduced reliability 
of dams is due to various causes, namely those related to developer, type of financing, project, 
construction and conservation during exploration. 
In 1990 the first Portuguese regulation was created, which imposed dam break studies and 
elaboration flooding maps to all new and existing structures, which included the flooding maps 
(FRANCA et al., 2011). Today these flooding maps are being used by planners on the 
implementation of dam´s IEP (Internal Emergency action Plans). The IEP it’s a requirement of the 
new regulation, RSB, published on October 2007 substituting the previous regulation dated 
from 1990.  
Property damage is certain when a dam breaks whereas loss of human lives is related with the 
extent and travelling time of the flood wave, with the number of the population in the near area 
and with the existence or not of a  warning system. 
The consequences of dam break accidents include these amongst the most feared flood hazards. 
Within the dam safety context, tailings dams from abandoned mines present added risk given the 
lack of surveying and maintenance (FRANCA et al., 2007) and increase the probability of 
environmental risks in the downstream valley. 
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1.2. FRAMEWORK 
 
1.2.1. Dams and failures 
 
A set of dam breaks have forced to reflect on the downstream valleys risks and in the prevention 
of potential effects (ALMEIDA, 2001). Examples of the most important dam breaks in Europe 
include: 
• Malpasset dam, concrete, in France, broke in 1959 and caused 421 deaths; 
• Vega de Tera dam, concrete, in Spain, partially broke in 1959 and caused 144 
deaths; 
• Vajont dam, concrete, in Italy, was overtopped and caused a landslide of about 
240 x 106 m3 of rock, resulting in 2600 deaths. 
SERAFIM (1989) presents statistical data on accidents with 142 dams, indicating: characteristics 
of the dam and reservoir; the year of construction and of the accident; the life stage of the dam 
when the accident occurred and the type of breakdown. 
LEMPÉRIÈRE (1993) states that accidents with dams caused the loss of about 10000 people in 
130 years (excluding China), 90 percent of these resulted only in 10 dam breaks. Table 1 
summarizes some of the major accidents with dams and their consequences. 
 
Table 1. Loss of lives resulting from accidents with dams (SINGH,1996 and SANTOS,1995). 
 
Country Name 
Date of 
aciddent 
Dam height 
(m) 
 
Loss of live 
 
Spain Puentes 1802 50 600 
U.S.A. Lynde Brook 1876 - - 
United Kingdom Dale Dyke 1884 - 250 
Japan Iruka 1888 - 1200 
U.S.A. South Fork 1889 21.9 2200 
France Bouzey 1895 15 86-100 
U.S.A. Austin 1911 14 80-700 
Italy Gleno 1923 22 100-600 
United Kingdom Eigian 1925 10.5 16 
U.S.A. Saint Francis 1928 55 450 
U.S.A. Brokaw 2 1938 - - 
Spain Vega de Terra 1959 34 144 
France Malpasset 1959 66.5 421 
Brazil Oros 1960 - 50 
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Table 1. Loss of lives resulting from accidents with dams (SINGH,1996 and SANTOS,1995). 
 
Country Name 
Date of 
aciddent 
Dam height 
(m) 
 
Loss of live 
 
Korea Hyokiri 1961 - 250 
Italy Vajont 1963 265 2600-3000 
Colombia Quebrada la 
Chapa 
1963 - 3 
U.S.A. Baldwin Hills 1963 - 3 
U.S.A. Mayfield 1965 - - 
U.S.A. Wyoming 1969 - - 
U.S.A. Buffalo Creek 1972 - 125 
Colombia Del Monte 1976 - 80 
U.S.A. Teton 1976 120 6-11 
 
A well documented and analyzed case-study was the drainage of the Lake Ha! Ha! consequence 
of the overtopping and erosion of the cut-away dyke (located across the head of separate bays 
just to the south of the dam), which occurred over a period of many hours. The overtopping of the 
dyke was caused by insufficient available capacity of the spillway at the time of extraordinary 
rainstorm and because the elevation of the dyke crest was below that of the concrete dam 
controlling the reservoir level. The flood produced morphologic changes downstream of the 
reservoir along the Ha!Ha! (BROOK et al.,1998).  
As it appears, in Portugal most of the accidents occurred in earth dams with small dimensions 
(FARIA, 2001). In the same year of the failure of Fonte Santa dam (2006), another accident 
occurred in Portugal, the failure of Herdade da Misericórdia dam in Aljustrel (Alentejo). This was 
an earth dam and it was assumed that the dam was overtopped due to an extraordinary rainfall 
event and insufficient capacity of the spillway discharge. Nonetheless main reasons to the break 
were piping induced by a longitudinal crack on the bottom outlet (cf. Figure 1 and Figure 2), thus 
introducing water within the embankment. This dam had a reservoir with a capacity about 
761500 m3 which, together with half of the embankment, were washed away downstream. There 
were no human lives affected, only the lost some arable land without economical relevance was 
referenced as consequence. Recently the embankment and the spillway have been subjected to 
improvements (Figure 3 and Figure 4).  
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Dam ruptures are usually classified in terms of its consequences (ALMEIDA, 2001 and SINGH, 
1996). A dam failure may be gradual or almost instantaneous (SINGH, 1996), typically 
embankment dams have a gradual break whereas in concrete dams the rupture is practically 
instantaneous. When the rupture is gradual a shock wave may not occur, and the breaching 
process may be gradual and slow. In a quasi instantaneous rupture, a shock wave is formed 
propagating downstream valley, with height and water speed much higher than the flow above 
the bedrock layer (FRANCA, 2002).The failure mechanism type is a determinant key for applying 
a simulation model of the breach.  
 
1.2.2. Tailings dams 
 
In the mining process the metal content is removed from the extracted minerals and the remains 
constitute a waste product - the tailings. Usually tailings are pumped through a mud form into a 
sedimentation basin, which can be a natural depression or a man-made dam. These dams are 
frequently built on an informal fashion with the continuous deposition of tailings. 
Historically, tailings were disposed in the most convenient and cost-effective places, often in 
flowing water valleys. The use of cyanide and other toxic reagents in mill processing has raised 
special concerns for some tailings and is leading to a prior treatment as well as increased 
attention to their containment, resulting in a growing research and emerging concepts of long-
  
 
Figure 1. Breach of Herdade da Misericórdia dam 
(2006). 
 
Figure 2. Crack observed at the bottom outlet of 
Herdade da Misericórdia dam (2006). 
 
 
Figure 3. Herdade da Misericórdia dam after 
rehabilitation (2011). 
Figure 4. Spillway of Herdade da Misericórdia dam 
of the rehabilitation (2011). 
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term control or mitigation (USEPA, 1994). Tailings impoundments are designed to perform a 
number of functions, including treatment functions (USEPA, 1994):  
• Removal of suspended solids by sedimentation. 
• Precipitation of heavy metals as hydroxides. 
• Permanent containment of tailings. 
• Stabilization of oxidizable constituents (e.g. cyanides). 
• Storage and stabilization of process of water recycling.  
• Retention of flow from storm flows. 
 
Tailings retention dams are similar to water retention dams in what regards soil properties, 
surface water and ground water controls and stability considerations. Tailings dam are suitable 
for any type of tailings and deposition methods (USEPA, 1994). A schematic cross-section of a 
typical tailings dam is given in Figure 5:  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Schematic cross-section of a tailings dam (VICK, 1990). 
  
Associated with the above presented solution, also called the traditional solution, three different 
profiles can be drawed, according to the heightening and construction process (SERRA (2001) 
[apud USEPA (1994)] ) (Figure 6): 
 
• Upstream method profile (Figure 6 a) 
• Centered method profile (Figure 6 b) 
• Downstream method profile (Figure 6 c) 
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Figure 6. Embankment types of tailings dams according to the construction process: (a) 
Upstream method, (b) Centered method, (c) Downstream method (VICK, 1990). 
 
Table 2 shows a comparison between the different embankments types above mentioned: 
 
Table 2.  Comparison of embankment types (USEPA, 1994) 
 
Traditional Upstream method 
 
Downstream 
method 
Centered 
method 
T
a
il
in
g
s
 
c
h
a
ra
c
te
ri
s
ti
c
s
 Suitable for 
any type of 
tailings. 
 
At least 60% sand in whole 
tailings. 
Low pulp density for grain-
size segregation. 
 
Suitable for any 
type of tailings. 
 
Sands. 
 
D
is
c
h
a
rg
e
 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 
 
Any 
discharge 
procedure is 
suitable. 
 
Peripheral discharge, well-
controlled beach necessary. 
 
Varies according 
to design detail. 
 
Peripheral 
discharge of at 
least nominal 
beach. 
necessary. 
W
a
te
r-
S
to
ra
g
e
 
s
u
it
a
b
il
it
y
 
 
Good. 
 
Not suitable for significant 
water storage. 
 
Good. 
 
Not 
recommended 
for permanent 
storage.  
 
S
e
is
m
ic
 
re
s
is
ta
n
c
e
 
 
Good. 
 
Poor in high seismic areas. 
 
Good. 
 
Acceptable. 
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Table 2.  Comparison of embankment types (USEPA, 1994) 
 
Traditional Upstream method 
 
Downstream 
method 
Centered 
method 
E
m
b
a
n
k
m
e
n
t 
fi
ll
 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 
 
Natural soil 
borrow. 
 
Native soil, sand tailings, 
waste rock. 
 
Sand tailings, 
waste rock, 
native soils. 
 
Sand tailings, 
waste rock, 
native soil. 
 
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 
e
m
b
a
n
k
m
e
n
t 
c
o
s
t 
 
High. 
 
Low. 
 
High. 
 
Moderate. 
 
U
s
e
 o
f 
L
o
w
 
p
e
rm
e
a
b
il
it
y
 
c
o
re
s
 
 
Possible. 
 
Not possible. 
 
Possible 
(inclined cone). 
 
Possible (central 
cone). 
 
 
1.2.3. Portuguese dam safety regulation  
 
The present portuguese dam safety regulation (RSB, DL n.º344/07) was published on  October 
2007 substituting the previous regulation dated from 1990. The new regulation applies to large 
dams (height ≥ 15 m) and also to dams with reservoir capacity larger than 100000 m3, being it’s 
application mandatory to existent dams as well as other dams depending on the downstream 
hazard classification. Portuguese dams which are under the scope of RSB have to be classified 
and the final opinion is given by the Institute of water (INAG), approving or disapproving that 
proposal (PINHEIRO et al., 2010). 
According to RSB dams are classified according to their hazards into three degrees, depending 
on to the number of persons and on the economic and environmental values affected by the flood 
wave due to a dam failure. Dwellers may be permanent residents or temporary occupants of the 
valley. Temporary dwellers are people occupying facilities only during limited periods of time (e.g. 
recreational activities in fluvial beaches during summer time); these are accounted as a third 
since an occupation equivalent to 8 h/day is considered. 
Class 1 dams correspond to the highest potential hazard and this is attributed to dams that, in 
case of failure, will affect 25 or more resident. These dams must be monitored by LNEC (National 
Laboratory of Civil Engineering) and they should have a IEP (Internal Emergency action Plan). 
Class 2 corresponds to a significant hazard associated to the dams which affect at least one 
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resident. Third class dams have low hazard, being this classification attributed to dams whose 
failure will not affect any human life (PINHEIRO et al., 2010). The IEP, as referred before is a 
requirement of the new regulation and it is demanded to dam owners to be implemented under 
the supervision of Dam Authority (INAG). It is related to the reservoir and downstream valley 
safety in the area of self-rescue (ZAS). It should include studies of accidents, flood wave, 
identification and implementation of the ZAS and the implementation of warning systems 
(ANPC & INAG, 2009). Within the boundaries of the flooding map but outside of ZAS, it is ANPC 
(National Civil Protection Authority) responsibility, warn and evacuate the population by the 
activation of EEP (External Emergency Plan) (ANPC & INAG, 2009). 
 
1.3. STATE OF ART 
 
Nowadays innumerous tools are available to model dam breaks including their outflow 
hydrographs and the propagation of the consequent flood wave traveling downstream. Dam 
break analysis is thus subdivided into two distinct problems: 
• Prediction of outflow hydrograph; 
• Modelling the consequent flood wave. 
The first one is assessed in this work. Modelling the outflow hydrograph includes: routing the 
reservoir depletion; simulating the breach formation process where breach characteristics are 
important (e.g., shape, depth, width, breach formation time, material erodability) and computing 
the outflow through hydraulics principles (WAHL, 1998).  
RECLAMATION (1988) [apud WAHL (1998)] as defined four approaches to predict breach 
parameters: physically based methods, parametric models, predictor equations, comparative 
analysis. Many data or case studies for breaching process exists and different investigators had 
proposed numerous relations for estimating breach parameters or peak discharges. SINGH 
(1996), CADAM (2000) and ALMEIDA (2001) are some examples where modelling dam breach 
technology is approached and vastly described. In laboratory, many researchers studied dam 
failures by overtopping, (e.g. TINGSANCHALI and CHINNARASRI (2001)), all concerning 
homogeneous non-cohesive earth dams. These research efforts provided mainly outflow 
hydrographs, very useful data for model validation, but these theories failed to produce detailed 
phenomenological information: description of the geotechnical failures phases during the 
breaching process; interaction between hydrodynamic erosion and geotechnical failure and the 
influence of the saturation degree on shear strength of fill materials. Deterministic models 
(SINGH, 1996) covers only breaching process in homogeneous earth dams and e.g. 
TINGSANCHALI and CHINNARASRI (2001) among others, began to admit the main problem in 
these models is their inability to consider the hydrodynamic and geotechnical phenomena and for 
that it was necessary to create a link between these two principles. 
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FRANCA and ALMEIDA (2002) performed the first laboratorial study on outflows hydrographs in 
case of rockfill dams with upstream impervious layer. 
Examples of dam breaching models include, the National Weather Service BREACH (FREAD, 
1988) and RoDaB (Rockfill Dam breaching) lumped model. RoDaB model (FRANCA and 
ALMEIDA, 2004) aims at providing a consistent continuous hydrograph appropriated for 
downstream flood simulation. The methodology used in this latter is based on the governing 
equations of reservoir routing and depletion, breach erosion (Exner modified equations). 
FERREIRA et al. (2009) used the dense limit Chapman-Enskog´s kinetic theory developed non-
newtonian conceptual models for geomorphic dam-break flows. The model developed by 
FERREIRA et al. (2009) is applicable to the morphologic evolution of rivers subjected to the 
transport of poorly sorted sediment mixtures at low shear stress and to geomorphic flows 
featuring intense sediment transport at high shear stresses. These model present numerical 
solutions to idealized situations of variable flow with nonequilibrium transport. The main equations 
of this model applied on the simulation of earth dam breaching process is explained in chapter 4, 
where it is applied to predict the evolution of the failure of Fonte Santa tailings dam.  
 
1.4. OBJECTIVES 
 
This thesis aims at analyzing the causes associated to the rupture of Fonte Santa tailings dam, 
the breaching process and the consequences of the passage of the flood wave through the 
downstream valley. Therefore, all the elements raised in field surveys made in 2007 shortly after 
the accident are herein organized and thus an analysis of the downstream valley prior and after 
the dam break is made; some of the data collected is used to calibrate a numerical model of the 
breaching process that provides a prediction of the dam break evolution. Finally modelling results 
are compared with empirical formulas. 
 
1.5. METHODOLOGY  
 
This work contains the reconstruction of the dam failure and an application of a computational 
model of the rupture process. The first results are based on data from field visits made in early 
2007, shortly after the accident, namely a topographic survey made during the visits and 
topographic maps. The authors of the field visits (FRANCA et al., 2007) and the dam owner 
(EDM) provided essential data for this study, namely: 
• Photos. 
• Topographic map 1:1000, which contained the dam before the break. 
• Hydrological data (inflow hydrograph data). 
• Drawings of downstream valley and the relevant coordinates of these profiles. 
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• Qualitative description of valley characteristics (estimate of erosion and deposition 
quantities and identification of hydrodynamics features). 
The first part of the accident reconstruction includes the dam characterization before and after the 
break. Topographic maps at 1:25000 and 1:1000 scales were used. Topographic maps at scale 
1:25000 allowed to profiling the creek Ribeiro da Ponte (where the Fonte Santa dam is located) 
and comparing the sections raised in 2007 where adequate topographic GPS were used. 
Through the survey of 2007 the amount of the eroded and deposited material in the downstream 
valley was quantified and compared with the volume of landfill and wedge of sludge that were 
washed with the rupture. 
The topographic map 1:1000 was used to characterize the dam body and reservoir, namely 
evaluate their volumes including the storage water and mud. The new results herein presented 
are compared with those presented preliminarily in FRANCA et al. (2007). 
Field information of the accident is used as an input to a computational model. The model of the 
breaching process simulates dynamically the failure progress due to overtopping of the structure 
as a function of the dam characteristics. The model is calibrated taking into account the observed 
final breach geometry. A detailed description of the numerical model used in this dissertation can 
be found in FERREIRA et al. (2009) and FERREIRA et al. (2010). 
 
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The dissertation is organized into five chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 presents a 
description of the events connected with the breaking, i.e. hydrological events and the 
characterization of the dam and reservoir before and after the accident.  The analysis of the 
downstream valley before and after the breaking including the morphological consequences and 
inundation area are presented in chapter 3. In order to assess the consequences in the 
downstream valley this was discretized in sections. The estimates of erosion and deposition were 
assessed as well as the maximum flood levels. Chapter 4 contains the mathematical simulation 
and calibration of the breaching process. The main conclusions are drawn and proposals for 
future studies are presented in chapter 5 and a list of references is presented subsequently. 
Finally the annexes are displayed as follows: 
• Annex I  –  Location of dam transept, reservoir transept and valley cross-section after the   
dam 
• Annex II  –  Reservoir transepts 
• Annex III –  Dam transepts 
• Annex IV – Cross-sections 
• Annex V  – Inundation map 
• Annex VI – Topographic map 
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2. DESCRIPTION OF THE DAM BREAK  
 
2.1. CHARACTERIZATION OF FONTE SANTA  DAM  
 
2.1.1. Location and construction methods 
 
Fonte Santa dam is situated on the municipality of Freixo de Espada à Cinta (Bragança), in the 
Northeast of Portugal, north of the Douro river (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Location of Fonte Santa tailings dam on a map showing the main dams belonging to Douro 
river basin. 
 
The Fonte Santa tailings dam, belonging to a mining complex abandoned for more than 30 years, 
was used mainly to retain the mud resulting from the washing process of extracted minerals. The 
minerals that came from the miner activity were scheelite and some wolframite. Fine gravel (tout-
venant) and tailings were the material used to construct the dam on an informal fashion. The 
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Fonte Santa dam had an irregular shape, with a large amount of the fine gravel spreading 
downstream along the valley banks (FRANCA et al., 2007). 
The crest was not object of a special design and it didn’t have a constant level; the construction 
was made progressively with coarse and fine material resulting from the mining works which were 
deposited randomly. 
The construction was a dynamic process; the tout-venant was placed progressively as well as the 
mud. The initial sludges were placed after the landfill construction. As referred in FRANCA et al. 
(2007), the mud deposited in the reservoir, with D50 of 0.0186 mm, contributed to keep the dam 
body impermeable along the years, as this material leaned against the body of the dam, 
practically embedded with the upstream slope. The photos taken in 2007 are fairly illustrative of 
this detail (see Figure 8 and later in the text Figure 12).  
 
 
 
Figure 8. View from downstream of the dam. A scar in the reservoir bottom is visible. 
 
The dam is located in a section of the valley where a rock formation exists (Figure 8). There is no 
knowledge of a dam project; apparently the dam material was placed to contain the sludge 
without any specific criteria. An embankment road was built along the downstream valley 
providing access to dam toe and in the field visit it was possible to see its remains on the first 
400 m of the valley. This road allowed local contractors to access the dam gravel and to explore 
the embankment material illegally (fine gravel used as a construction material), excavating 
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directly from the downstream dam toe. A spillway excavated in the rock exists in a valley adjacent 
to the reservoir (Figure 9) with a roughly circular section of 2 m diameter (FRANCA et al., 2007).  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Upstream section of the spillway. 
 
The spillway entrance level located on the reservoir left bank discharge was 504.4 m asl, which 
can be considered the normal operating level (cf. Annex VI). 
 
2.1.2. Dam body 
 
Fonte Santa tailings dam was an embankment of about 11050 m3 volume, approximately 12 m 
high, with crest length of roughly 30 m, crest width of roughly 5 m and the valley width at the 
bottom is about 11 m.   
Some of these values are ensuing from the present detailed and through analysis different from 
the ones given in FRANCA et al. (2007) as shown in Table 3. As referred earlier, the dam was not 
object of an adequate project and planning, being the construction method informal and 
evolutional. Thus, dam geometry is not regular. 
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Table 3. Main characteristics of dam and spillway. Comparison of the present values with the ones 
presented in FRANCA et al. (2007). 
 
 In present study FRANCA et al. (2007) 
Dam height, in average (m) 12 25 
Crest length (m)  30 35 
Valley width at the bottom (m) 11 11 
Volume (m3) 11049 4500 
Crest elevation (m asl) 505.0 505.0 
Spillway entrance(m asl) 504.4 504.4 
 
The present analysis was based on the map with scale 1:1000, where the dam layout    was 
represented. Cross-sections in the dam body were made every 2 meters, obtaining thus 16 
sections (cf. Annex I and Annex III), to allow volume estimation. The dam height was measured 
from the top to the bedrock; upstream, the dam body was bounded by roughly 7 m of sludge 
(cf. Annex III). As mentioned above, this tailings dam was constructed as a progressive process; 
the dam height eventually increased while the waste material of the mining activity deposited in 
the reservoir almost reached the dam crest. Therefore, the wedge of sludge is assumed adjacent 
to the dam body (cf. Figure 10). Figure 10 displays the central section representative of what was 
herein described; 16 transepts of the dam body were made to evaluate the dam volume 
integrating the cross-section by using the trapezoidal method, these are represented in the 
Annex III.  
 
 
Figure 10. Central cross-section of dam body and the retained mud (with no specific scale). 
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2.1.3. Characterization of the river catchment and the reservoir 
 
The Fonte Santa tailings dam is located on the creek Ribeiro da Ponte; the creek changes its 
name in the dam section, and upstream it is called Ribeiro das Caravelas. This creek belongs to 
river Douro basin (Figure 11).  The dam creates a basin of approximately 14.0 km2, see 
Figure 11, and its main watercourse is the Ribeiro das Caravelas which is  about 7.9 km long, 
qualified as torrential, attending to its longitudinal profile.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Dam catchment represented on the military map (No 120) herein represented (with no 
specific scale). 
 
The reservoir occupies approximately a superficial area of 2.20 ha calculated for 504.4 m asl and 
2.57 ha for 505.0 m asl. The reservoir volume was recalculated because the values obtained in 
2007 seemed unrealistic, obtaining thus about 155500 m3 for level 504.4 m asl and for a water 
elevation of 505.0 m asl about 173100 m3 (Table 4). To estimate the volume a method using the 
cross-sections assigned to an influence area was used (cf. Annex II). Knowing that the mud was 
roughly at elevation 501.0 m asl, it was possible to separate the water area and the area of mud 
through the cross-sections and get the volumes using influence areas of each transept. 
 
Table 4. Water and mud volumes for water elevations of 504.4 m asl and 505.0 m asl. 
 
 Volume for a water elevation 
504.4 m asl 
Volume for a water elevation 
505.0 m asl 
Water volume (m3) 72800 90440 
Mud volume (m3) 82670 82670 
Sum (m3) 155470 173110 
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Probably in the summer the water level was low and the mud was visible. The explanation to this 
observation is based on the photos taken in 2007. In the winter season, the normal water level 
was at 504.4 m asl or above this. The difference between normal operating level and mud level of 
3.4 m was inferred from the photos collected during survey. Figure 12 corroborates such analysis, 
showing that the bushes in the dam body grew eventually in the summer and had been under 
water in the winter season (deduction by the dry bushes). 
 
 
 
Figure 12. The remains of the dam slope and the wedge mud (at elevation 501 m asl). 
Dry bushes due to submersion in the winter season indicated with the black line. 
 
 
2.2. HYDROLOGY OF THE EVENT 
 
2.2.1. Extreme flood on the day of the event  
 
In FRANCA et al. (2007), the concentration time adopted to the river catchment was 3 h and the 
basin area soil occupation was characterized by a curve number of 90, considering the most 
humid antecedent conditions (AMCIII). This parameter was obtained from the CN (AMCII).  
According to FRANCA et al. (2007), on 20th November 2006 a large low-pressure system was 
centered in the Atlantic North near Iceland. From the 20th till the 24th of November this system 
moved towards the west coast of Ireland affecting the Portuguese territory. In the area of the 
Fonte Santa dam basin, a sea level pressure drop of approximately 25 mbar was observed 
between the days 20th and 24th of November (Figure 13). After the 24th, the system moved away 
from Ireland western coast, causing a pressure ascent in all Portuguese territory. The 25 mbar 
 
 17
pressure drop observed along those four days on the basin area was the cause of the extreme 
precipitation occurred on the 24th of November in all Portuguese territory. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Low-pressure system formed in Atlantic North on the days: a) 20th of November; b) 24th 
November 2006. (in: FRANCA et al. (2007)) 
 
2.2.2. Inflow Hydrograph  
 
The hydrology data provided to characterize the event were measured at meteorological station 
located in a village named Mogadouro, 12.5 km distant from Fonte Santa dam, the only station 
located in the interest area with useful precipitation registers of the event. Running the software 
HEC-HMS 3.1.0 (developed by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and adequate to simulate 
precipitation-runoff processes of watershed systems) and having as input data the above 
mentioned river basin characteristics, the output data is the flood hydrograph in Figure 14. 
According to information, kindly provided in 2007 by the Portuguese Instituto de 
Meteorologia I.P., between the 23rd and the 25th of November 2006, a total rainfall of about 112.8 
mm occurred on the basin area and 77% of this precipitation took place on the 24th, occurring 7% 
of the remaining precipitation on 23rd and 16% on 25th November. The peak flow of the 
hydrograph (19.5 m3/s) at the Fonte Santa dam was obtained on the 24th of November at 
8:50 am. The total volume of water inflow into the reservoir for the three days of rain was of 
1985 m3.  
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Figure 14. Inflow hydrograph. 
 
 
2.2.3. Outflow hydrograph and reservoir routing 
 
As referred before, there are two main tasks in the analysis of dam break events: the prediction of 
the reservoir outflow hydrograph and the routing of that hydrograph through the downstream 
valley (WAHL, 1998). The difference between lumped and distributed reservoir routing is that in a 
lumped system model, the flow is calculated as a function of a time alone at a particular location, 
whereas in a distributed system routing the flow is calculated as a function of space and time 
throughout the system (CHOW et al., 1988).  
For a hydrologic system the continuity equation may take the simplified form: 
 
)()( tQtI
dt
dS
−=      (2.1) 
I       – the inflow into the reservoir as function of time 
Q     – the outflow from the reservoir 
dt
dS
 – rate of change of storage volume 
A number of procedures and methods have been proposed for calculating the outflow hydrograph 
from a reservoir during a dam break (CHOW et al., 1988). In this work the inflow hydrograph, to 
be used later on the numerical modelling of the dam breach process, was considered null 
because the dam accident only occurred on the 27th November and as seen in Figure 14, the 
inflow after 26th November is negligible.  
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2.3. DAM BREACHING 
 
2.3.1. Dam breach causes 
 
As mentioned above, an extraordinary rainfall event took place in the region on the 23rd and 24th 
November 2006 and the dam failure happened only on the 27th November. The description of a 
loud sound heard on that day by local residents at a distance of 1000 m suggests a rather sudden 
wave travelling across the valley (FRANCA et al., 2007). 
It is not clear how the breaking process occurred in this case. However, two situations may have 
occurred  simultaneously: 1) the water level in the reservoir should be slightly  below the dam 
crest   (< 505.0 m asl)  and with the high precipitation during three days the dam may have been 
overtopped for an unknown period and suddenly on the 27th the destabilization of the body dam 
and the complete  failure  occurred; 2) The spillway discharged eventually got clogged on the 
27th, which induced the overflowing of the reservoir and consequent overtopping of the dam with 
subsequent dam failure. 
The breaching dynamic process will be simulated and discussed in chapter 4, using the numerical 
model presented in FERREIRA et al.( 2009). 
 
2.3.2. Breach geometry 
 
WAHL (1998) affirmed that the parameters of an idealized dam breach in an embankment are the 
width, the depth, the side slope factor and the formation time.  During the survey the breach 
parameters were obtained. The dam did not have a symmetrical and homogeneous shape as 
mentioned before. The final geometry has a nearly trapezoidal shape. The main geometric 
characteristics of breach geometry are shown in Table 5 and Figure 16 
 
Table 5. Dam breach geometric parameters. 
 
Top width (m) 30 
Bottom width (m) 11 
Approximate height (m) 12 
Right riverbank slope (angle with the horizontal)  9.5 : 15.4 
Left riverbank slope (angle with the horizontal) 9.5 : 11.5 
 
These parameters are similar to the others proposed in FRANCA et al. (2007); only the height is 
quite different. The trapezoidal shape and the dam symmetry inferred in the 2007 survey are 
different, since the latter did not take into count the bedrock level. The breach parameters are 
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used later in the text for applying the numerical model; this will allow an estimation of the breach 
formation time. 
 
  
 
Figure 15. Dam breach, view from downstream. The 
rock formation from the riverbed is visible. 
 
Figure 16. Breach dam geometric (no specific scale). 
 
 
2.3.3. Estimated water and mud releases 
 
As evidenced at the spot in the first field visit, the dam body and a wedge of sludge and the 
reservoir water were washed to the downstream valley (Figure 8, Figure 12 and Figure 18). After 
the failure, residual water, fed by valley base flow, continued running downstream, opening a path 
on the reservoir sludge allowing the visualization of deposited layer through more sediments were 
transported downstream the valley. Only the sludge washed away during the failure was relevant 
to quantify the breach consequences in the downstream valley. 
Here the water and sludge released at the time of the breach are estimated. The maximum water 
in the reservoir (505.0 m asl) corresponds to the maximum capacity of water in the reservoir. 
Figure 17 shows the stage-volume curve for the Fonte Santa reservoir, with sludge. The relation 
between the reservoir storage capacity and the water elevation from bedrock (not from sludge 
elevation) may be approximated by the following non-linear equation: 
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Figure 17. Reservoir capacity, with sludge. 
 
The eroded amount of sludge from the upstream deposits in the reservoir is evidenced by a scar 
in the reservoir bottom (cf. Figure 8, Figure 12, Figure 15 and Figure 18) 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Dam breach, view from upstream. The wedge of mud is visible. 
 
The total volume (dam body and wedge mud) eroded and transported to the downstream valley 
are shown in Table 6: 
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Table 6. Estimated water and wedge mud releases during the breaching process. 
 
Estimated water volume in the reservoir from 501 m asl to 505.0 m asl (m3) 90440 
Estimated wedge mud volume 3500 
 
2.3.4. Estimation of dam breach characteristics based on empirical formulations 
 
There are several theoretical methods for estimating breach formation time (cf. WAHL (1998)), 
VON THUN and GILLETTE (1990) proposed: 
 
25.002.0 += wf ht      (2.3) 
 
tf – breach formation time (hours) 
hw – depth of water (m)  
 
They found a stronger correlation between the lateral erosion rate and depth and then for a total 
breach formation time versus depth. Using lateral erosion rate data, VON THUN and GILLETTE 
(1990) obtained: 
 
w
f
h
B
t
4
=       (2.4) 
 
bw ChB += 5.2                         (2.5)  
 
Cb a function of reservoir storage (m), as follows: 
 
Table 7. Function of reservoir storage. 
 
Reservoir size (m3) Cb (m) 
< 1.23 x 10
6
 6.1 
1.23 x 10
6
 – 6.17x 10
6
 18.3 
6.17x 10
6
 – 1.23 x 10
7
 42.7 
> 1.23 x 10
7
 54.9 
 
FROEHLICH (1995) related the peak outflow to a power equation of both the breaching head and 
outflow volume, using case study data for 22 dam failures: 
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24.1295.0
607.0 wwp hVQ =     (2.6) 
 
Qp – peak breach outflow (m
3/s) 
Vw – initial water volume above the final breach bottom position (m
3
)  
 
WEBBY (1996) used dimensional analysis techniques to develop a similar equation for peak 
outflow using Froehlich´s data: 
 
40.1367.05.00443.0 wwp hVgQ =      (2.7) 
 
g – gravity acceleration (m/s
2
) 
 
For instant breaks with a complete removal of the dam and without dissipation of energy, the 
peak breach outflow corresponds to the RITTER solution, which is an upper bound of the real 
outflow discharges. RITTER (1892): 
 
2
3
27
8
wvp hgBQ =       (2.8) 
 
Bv – valley average width (m) 
 
The following tables give the results by applying these mentioned empirical formulations to Fonte 
Santa dam. 
 
Table 8. Breach formation time. 
 VON THUN and GILLETTE (1990). 
First equation. 
VON THUN and GILLETTE (1990).  
Second equation. 
Tf (s) 1800 2880 
hw (m) 11.35 11.35 
Cb (m) - 6.1 
B (m) - 34 
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Table 9.  Peak breach outflow solutions. 
 
 FROEHLICH (1995) WEBBY (1996) RITTER (1892) 
Qp (m
3/s) 358 274 972 
Vw (m
3
) 90440 90440 - 
Bv (m) - - 27.40 
 
The time to the breach formation is between 30 minutes and less than one hour and outflow peak 
by FROEHLICH (1995) is 358 m3/s and by WEBBY (1996) solution is 274 m3/s, both bounded by 
RITTER solution results. 
 
2.4. DISCUSSION 
 
As referred, there is no knowledge of a dam project; the dam shape wasn’t regular and it didn’t 
have a horizontal crest level. This was a tailings dam without any formal approval for its 
construction. The description of a loud sound heard on that day by local residents at a distance of 
1000 m suggests a rather sudden wave travelling across the valley (FRANCA et al., 2007), and 
for that it is believed that the dam failure happened only on the 27th November, although the 
rainfall event took place in the region on the 23rd and 26th November 2006. It is not clear how the 
breaking process occurred. However, as described before two situations may have occurred 
simultaneously, situation that may had weakened the embankment. This study contributes 
positively in order to obtain data from hydrologic, hydraulics and geometric data of Fonte Santa 
mine tailings previously unknown. 
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3. ANALYSIS OF THE DOWNSTREAM VALLEY  
 
3.1. VALLEY MORPHOLOGY PRIOR TO THE DAM BREAK 
 
This chapter aims at updating and improving the accuracy of the estimates of the previous field 
survey FRANCA et al. (2007) after the dam break, in what concerns hydrodynamic impact and 
morphological changes in the downstream valley. 39 sections were surveyed after the dam break, 
relevant to the present analysis where important morphological changes in the valley occurred 
corresponding mainly to areas of significant deposition/erosion patterns. 
To analyse the valley morphology prior to the dam break, cross-section at the same locations 
studied in the field visit in 2007 (after the dam break) were made, based on   the 1:25000 military 
topographic map No. 120 (Annex IV) . 39 sections data were overlapped with the 1:25000 
topographic map showing that the sections 0,1,2 were coincident with the dam body; thus, for this 
study, these sections were included in the dam body and the downstream valley analysis started 
from section 3 (cf. Annexes III and VI). 
To define the thalweg of the surveyed valley transepts, the minimum value of the cross-sections 
obtained by the topographic map 1:25000 were used instead the 2007 field survey data. The 
profiles obtained for these 39 sections were roughly similar to the profiles raised for the same 
sections in field visit (2007). The differences between these two surveys are probably due to the 
fact that distances and slopes inclination raised in the field were estimated locally. 
 
3.2. VALLEY MORPHOLOGY AFTER THE DAM BREAK 
 
During 2007 surveys, data were collected by means of GPS Fast Static Surveying by a rover 
Leica-GS20 as mentioned in FRANCA et al., (2007); for post-processing,  the Leica GISDataPro 
was used with a reference station based in Mirandela (coordinates inWGS84: Lat 
41◦31_00.41592__N; Long 07◦11_10.19545__O; Ellipsoidal height 332.019 m; Mean Sea Level 
height 275.954 m). The reference station belongs to the GPS/GNSS network, managed by the 
Portuguese Geographic Institute. The results of the post processing reveal a mean position and 
height quality of approximately 20 cm FRANCA et al. (2007).  
The extensive field visit in 2007 to the downstream valley was supported by adequate 
topographic GPS. GPS provided data: for the coordinates of the 39 sections (sections with 
relevance in the analysis of valley) regarding the dam and relevant points that defined 
erosion/deposition and maximum water levels for each section, covering a total of 2525 m .  
According to local accounts, the dispersion of the mud released from the reservoir, however, was 
observed at the creek outlet at Sabor river (more than 17.5 km downstream the dam), although 
with no significant impact on the river morphology.  
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In this work, the first section defined as the dam section corresponds to the second section, i.e. 
cross-section 2 (Table 10) defined in the field visit. Now, the distance between the dam section 
and the last section (cross-section 34) is reduced by 26.5 m (distance among section 0 – 2, see 
Table 10). Sections with the same number (6´, 10´, 22´, 29´) (see Annex IV) correspond to a 
widening or an important structure and they were included to better detail these valley 
singularities. Table 10 shows the sections numbers and their corresponding distance relatively to 
the dam section: 
 
Table 10. Distance between the dam section and the last section surveyed where significant impact in river 
morphology was observed. 
 
Cross-
section 
2007 
Distance (m) 
 
 
Distance from 
the dam 
section 
herein 
adopted (m) 
 
 
Cross-
section 
2007 
Distance (m) 
 
Distance 
from the dam 
section 
herein 
adopted (m) 
 
0 0   18 1053.47 1026.99 
1 11.12   19 1085.26 1058.78 
2 26.49 0  20 1124.36 1097.88 
3 46.25 19.76  21 1185.81 1159.33 
4 68.58 42.1  22 1233.38 1206.9 
5 100.42 73.94  22´ 1241.73 1215.25 
6 159.54 133.06  23 1303.67 1277.19 
6´ 182.64 156.16  24 1349.74 1323.26 
7 246.81 220.34  25 1459.90 1433.42 
8 327.02 300.54  26 1509.19 1482.71 
9 377.19 350.71  27 1792.12 1765.64 
10 482.86 456.38  28 1844.19 1817.71 
10´ 524.73 498.25  29 1941.17 1914.69 
11 567.89 541.41  29´ 2039.27 2012.79 
12 674.61 648.13  30 2058.10 2031.61 
13 780.74 754.26  31 2165.46 2138.98 
14 837.67 811.2  32 2261.53 2235.05 
15 900.60 874.13  33 2305.06 2278.58 
16 946.05 919.58  34 2524.88 2498.39 
17 990.25 963.78     
 
 
For each section a schematic drawing was made (Annex IV). Figure 19 shows one of these, 
sections; corresponding to section 6. This section is near the dam containing the road to access 
to the dam toe previously mentioned and that was eroded. 
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Figure 19. Cross-section 6, example of the detailed survey (cf. Annex IV). 
 
In Figure 20 the channel width is presented along the valley; this is herein defined as the locally 
observed lateral extension of the dam break reach, i.e. the width of the actual active channel 
during the passage of maximum flood discharge. After the first section, the channel width 
decreases; sections 9 (distance about 350 m after the dam), 10´ (distance about 498 m after the 
dam) present an increase relatively to the adjacent sections (prior and after); those with a large 
increase were: 7 →9 (distance about 220 m and 350 m after the dam, respectively); 18→22 
(distance about 1026 m and 1206 m after the dam, respectively); 29´→30 (distance about 2012 m 
and 2031 m after the dam, respectively). In section 20 (distance about 1097 m after the dam) it 
was observed an isle in the middle of the channel, eventually made by the flood wave which 
formed a channel near the left bank isolating a portion of soil and vegetation (cf.  Annex IV). 
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Figure 20. Lateral extension of the morphological impacts of the flood wave. 
 
It is important to refer that about 2000 m downstream the dam there is a bridge, where a 
reduction of the channel width exists (Figure 21 and Figure 22). This constitutes a control section 
and during the flood a reservoir was created upstream. 
 
  
Figure 21. View from the bridge to downstream 
(Section 29). 
 
Figure 22. View from the bridge from upstream 
(Section 29). 
 
 
The largest width corresponds to section 31 (distance about 2138 m after the dam),  where water 
level decreased (Figure 23)  as downstream sections (32, 33, and 34) had a wall on the left bank 
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of the river that reduced the width. In these latter river sections it was also observed thick 
vegetation on the river banks. 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Maximum flood levels observed in field. 
 
In Figure 24 the maximum water level along the valley profile and the thalweg elevation are 
shown. The thalweg elevation was calculated through 1:25000 topographic map. The water 
depths were as high as about 6 m and this occurred in the first sections, just after the dam where 
the valley is narrower.  
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Figure 24. Valley profile with the maximum flood levels observed in field. 
 
In Annex V an inundation map consequence of the dam break occurrence where the maximum 
limits of the flood are visible, is presented. Erosion/deposition volumes were estimated taking into 
account the erosion/deposition areas surveyed in the field visit at each section and multiplied by 
the influence lengths that each section had. The amount of total erosion by section was the result 
of bed and banks erosion (lateral erosion). Figure 25 shows erosion and deposition volumes 
along the valley; this starts at the first section after the dam and does not account for the amounts 
corresponding to the dam body and the mud eroded from the reservoir.  
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Figure 25. Estimated erosion and deposition volumes of the river bed and banks throughout the 
downstream valley (body dam and wedge mud are not included). 
 
 
  
 
Figure 26. Section with high erosion. 
 
Figure 27. Section with high deposition. 
 
The main erosion occurs in the first 300 m downstream the dam (see Figure 28). This part of the 
valley was filled with an informal road to keep access to the dam downstream slope for illicit 
gravel extraction (see chapter 2.1.1). Consequently, the discharge outflowing from the dam break 
washed this road which constitutes the main source of the eroded material in the valley. The 
lower width channel, the maximum water level and the eventual large flow velocity, consequently 
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eroded vastly the road material (Figure 26). After 300 m, the main erosion observed results from 
bank erosion and not specifically from bed erosion.  
The deposition occurred essentially where the available flow area increased offering conditions to 
lower flow velocities lowering thus transport capacity (Figure 27). 
Downstream the dam it is possible to see that the fraction of deposition is nearly the double of the 
erosion, this last one is concentrated near the dam section, where the valley was filled with the 
illicit road referred previously. Downstream, mainly deposition of the dam material is verified due 
to the immense volume of fine gravel that composed the informal dam body (Figure 28). It was 
verified locally that some part of the deposited material throughout the valley is originated from 
the same material of the dam body.  
 
 
 
Figure 28. Example of a local where large deposition occurred (roughly at section 10´). 
 
On the next tables, estimation of eroded and deposited volumes are given. 
 
Table 11.  Total erosion and deposition volumes of body and mud wedge from the reservoir. 
 
Body dam (m3) 11050 
Mud wedge from the reservoir (m3) 3510 
Total (m3) 14560 
 
Note that the volume of body dam includes the erosion volume of section 0, 1 and 2.  
 
Table 12.  Total erosion and deposition volumes throughout the downstream valley. 
 
Total erosion in the valley (bed+ banks) (m3) 4575 
Total deposition (m3) 9370 
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With these values one obtains the total volume balance along the valley: 
 
3
)( 9765%100 mVDEVV sbanksbedes =∆⇔≤≈−+∆=∆ +   (3.1) 
∆Vs – balance between volume of the erosion in bed + banks and dam + mud released and the 
deposition (m
3
) 
∆Ve – volume of the dam and mud released (m
3
) 
E (bed+banks) – volume of the erosion in bed and in the banks along the downstream valley (m
3
) 
D – deposition volume (m
3
) 
There is a difference of 9765 m3 between erosion and deposition estimates (Table 11 and 
Table 12). Mud wedge volume was estimated by photos; this value can be unrealistic and it is 
possible that the sludge travelled downstream more than 2500 m. The greatest erosion, as seen 
in Figure 25 is concentrated in the first 300 m; probably these values obtained ‘in situ’ are 
overestimated. If one considers the distance between the study reach and Sabor river, roughly 
15 km, and taking into account that fine sediments reached this river according to local accounts 
(a layer of roughly 0.10 m deposited along de valley), this could arguably represent this 
difference. 
 
3.3. DISCUSSION 
 
The inundation reach and the main morphological impacts of dam break were reconstructed. The 
35+4 cross-sections along the downstream valley were considered sufficient to characterize 
Ribeiro da Ponte creek. A clear symmetric pattern between maximum water depths and river 
widths is observed, i.e. larger valley correspond to lower water depths.  
The main erosion happened at the first 300 m and after this distance there was only little bank 
erosion. The deposited material volume is twice the eroded material without accounting for the 
body dam and wedge mud. Adding the body dam + wedge mud it was not possible to obtain 
equilibrium of the erosion/volume with the deposition/volume, within this study reach of 2500 m. 
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4. MATHEMATICAL MODELLING OF THE BREACHING  
 
4.1. DESCRIPTION OF THE NUMERICAL MODEL 
 
The model STAV-breach simulated the breaching progress due to overtopping of the dam as a 
function of the dam characteristics and it is herein applied after calibration based on the 
observations in the field. A detailed description of STAV (Strong Transients in Alluvial Valleys) 
breach model can be found in FERREIRA et al. (2009). The model is to provide a consistent and 
continuous outflow hydrograph, adequate as a upstream boundary condition for flow propagation 
calculations. 
The flow is assumed 2D and considered stratified where a mixture of water and granular material 
removed from the bottom is considered. The granular phase is assumed to be composed by 
quasi-elastic and slightly rough and nearly spherical sediment grains. The fluid is viscous and 
incompressible. The model considers three layers in the flow (Figure 29): A) a layer of clean 
water or with suspended sediments where turbulent stresses are dominant (RANS equations are 
used within this layer); B) a transport layer where stresses source are mainly collisional effects 
(mass conservation equation, movement quantity equation and a closure defining the energy 
associated to the particles fluctuation are used within this layer, deducted from the context of the 
theory of Chapman-Enskog); C) bed-sediment layer with insignificant horizontal movement 
(FERREIRA et al., 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Sketch of the stratified flow idealized in the 
numerical model. The more relevant flow regions 
described earlier are indicated. 
Figure 30. Definition of discretized areas. 
 
 
The model is based in four essentials equations (4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). Total mass conservation 
equation of the embankment, FERREIRA et al. (2009): 
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(4.1) 
 
Where: 
Ab –  the remaining dam area (m
2
) 
sQ – solid flow (m
3
/s) 
*
sQ – solid flow in equilibrium (m
3
/s) 
pb –  bed porosity [-] 
Λ –  attenuation factor (FERREIRA et al. 2009) [-] 
Al –  area of deposition originated from slopes lateral instability (m
2
) 
 
A mass conservation equation on transport layer: 
 
        (4.2) 
 
 
Cc – concentration on the transport layer [-] 
Ac – area of the transport layer (m
2
) 
Uc –velocity at the transport layer (m
2/s) 
 
Backwater curve equation for the flow along the breach (quasi-permanent approach),  
 
 
     (4.3) 
 
 
h – elevation in relation to the bottom of channel (m) 
zb – geometry elevation to a reference plan (m) 
A – channel sectional area (m
2
) 
g – gravity acceleration (m/s
2
) 
Ql – liquid flow (m
3/s) 
Sf – energy slope [-] 
 
A weir-type equation for describing the flow ensuing from the reservoir:: 
 
     (4.4) 
*
(1 )
b s s
l
b
A Q Q
A
t p
∂ −
= ±
∂ Λ −
*
c c c c c s sA C A C U Q Q
t x
∂ ∂ −
+ = −
∂ ∂ Λ
2
22
b f
d Q
h z S
dx gA
 
+ + = − 
 
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Bcrit – channel critical flow width (m) 
Acri t– critical flow area (m
2
) 
 
In the framework of the present thesis the following improvements were added to the model: 
 
• Introduction of the mass conservation on the reservoir (reservoir routing equation): 
 
                                                         QI
dt
dV
−=                            (4.5) 
Where: 
I – inflow (m3/s) 
V – volume of water on the reservoir (m3) 
t – time (s) 
 
• Outputs and preview options were included. 
 
As an input the model required: 
• Dam initial geometry (Figure 31) as a mesh of 80x16 elements spaced of 2.0 m 
describing the crest elevation, varying in space and the downstream slope (for this 
specific dam, and given the informal constructing process, the crest was not horizontal 
thus crest levels were introduced as a vector across the valley). 
• Reservoir initial water volume and stage-volume curve (non-linear equation). In the 
imminence of overtopping, the reservoir was considered with a volume corresponding to 
the lowest level of the crest. A non-linear equation relating water level and storage 
volume was also included in the model (equation 2.2). 
• The inflow was introduced as zero; the rupture took place at the end of the extreme flood 
(cf. chapter 2.2.2). 
 
Different attenuation factors were used to parameterize the code. No restriction to stop the code 
was used i.e., when the reservoir flood depletes, the run is continued.  
No boundary condition to the sludge level was introduced; the model does not accept this 
imposition and no results were obtained on the sludge depletion. 
The aim of this model is to provide a consistent continuous outflow hydrograph. 
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Figure 31.  Discretization of the dam: 3D grid. Initial time. 
 
 
4.2. MODEL PARAMETERIZATION 
 
The model depends only on one value suitable for calibration, Λ (cf. equation 4.1 and 4.2) which 
correspond to a geometric scale associated to the length necessary for the attenuation of a given 
perturbation in the flow or imposition of a non-equilibrium condition.  
Λ was tested on a range between 30000 and 5000000. 
The aim of this parameterization was to obtain the reservoir level of 501 m asl with the 
simultaneity of the breach level of 494 m asl, i.e. when reservoir level reaches the sludge level (at 
level 501 m asl). At this moment supposedly no be no more water exists on the reservoir thus no 
transport capacity is verified and thus the breach should reach its final level. 
Attenuation factors were tested for the range mentioned before and to obtain the simultaneity 
intended was not possible. 
For the minimum value of Λ Figure 32 shows an example where that such simultaneity was no 
obtained. 
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Figure 32. Comparation of the reservoir level (Nres) with the breach level (Zbreach) (Λ = 30000). 
 
For others attenuation factors results were very similar 
 
4.3. RESULTS 
 
The model was run as referred previously for different attenuation factors. The results are 
presented for Λ = 30000; 40000; 70000; 100000; 200000; 2000000; 5000000. 
Figure 33 and Figure 34 show the most relevant results for this study.  
Figure 33 represents the evolution of the breach along time and Figure 34 show the outflow 
thought the breach along time. 
Analyzing the different values, verifying the attenuation factors does not change much.   
 
The final results, 
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Figure 33. Breach level for different attenuation factors. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Outflow for different attenuation factors. 
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The results shown on Figure 37 and Figure 38, show consistence and indicate that the breach 
may characterize as in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Main results of the numerical simulations 
Qp (m
3/s) ~100 
Breach formation time (min) ~ 56 
Qp time (min) ~ 12 
 
Since there is no great difference between values of the various attenuation factors Λ = 200000 
utilized in the literature (FERREIRA et al., 2009) seems to be acceptable value. 
The outflows for the different attenuation lengths (Figure 34) are continuous and consistent 
enough to be introduced in the simulation of the inundation wave of the downstream valley.  
 
 
4.4. DISCUSSION 
 
The results are in the same order of magnitude as the empirical estimates, but with lower values, 
thus the model can be considerate reasonably consistent with the expected characteristics of the 
breaching process.  
In the numerical simulation, the break longed about 56 min and the maximum outflow occurred 
about 12 min after, the dam overtopping with a maximum effluent flow thought the breach 
estimated as Qp = 100 m
3/s.  
The attenuation factors of 200000 utilized in the literature seems to be acceptable value. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
5.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The dissertation presents the reconstitution of the Fonte Santa dam break, including the dam 
breaching process and the evaluation of the consequences to the downstream valley. 
The causes of the accident were identified: 
• An exceptional rainfall and consequent flood with a peak flow of 19.5 m3/s; 
• The spillway discharged and eventually got clogged 
The breach corresponds closely to the valley configuration; the dam has been completely eroded 
(~11000 m3). 
The flow heights (0.5 m to 6 m) as well the morphological changes are strongly influence by the 
valley morphology. Part of erosion process (~4500 m3) occurred in the first 250 m after the dam. 
Along the valley the eroded material were deposited, when the flow transport capacity was 
insufficient (on the stretch of the study valley, a zero mass balance is not observed).  
It appears from the numerical simulation that the break have occurred from about 1 h and the 
maximum flow occurred about 12 min after the dam overtopping. The maximum effluent flow 
thought the breach was estimated at Qp = 100 m
3/s. It seems to be a reasonable value the 
attenuation factors Λ = 200000 used in the literature to parameterize STAV-breach model. 
This study completes and updates the preliminary survey of FRANCA et al. (2007). 
 
5.2. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Field data from dam break accidents, including not only the characterization of the final breach 
configuration but also the consequences in the downstream valley, are rare and always welcome 
to modelers, scientists and practitioners, to validate their own computational models. 
The reconstitution of the Fonte Santa dam break constitutes thus a useful database to be used in 
benchmark tests of dam breaching models and flood routing models. 
With the outflow hydrograph obtained with the model STAV-breach, in the future one way 
simulate, with appropriated models, the routing of the hydrograph through the downstream valley 
and compare the results with the downstream valley survey (namely, water level and 
morphological changes) raised in this present work. 
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